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Parodies make fun of a thing by copying enough of it to make it
recognizable while subverting the message of the original.1 Most people
don’t like being made fun of. Some of those people turn to intellectual
property (IP) law in an effort to suppress those parodies.
When IP owners use copyright law to suppress parodies, the courts
†
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1
The Supreme Court defines parody as the “joinder of reference and ridicule.”
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994) (“It is this joinder of
reference and ridicule that marks off the author’s choice of parody from . . . other types of
comment and criticism . . . .”); see also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d
109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (parody borrows from the original but “differs [from it] in a way
that may reasonably be perceived as commenting, through ridicule,” on the original’s
character or meaning). We put off until Part III further discussion of the definition of a
parody.
*
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have generally rejected those claims. The Supreme Court in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. gave parody a fairly wide exemption under the
fair use doctrine, at least where the parody didn’t substitute for the
original work (as it almost never will).2 More recently, the Seventh
Circuit held in a case involving a South Park episode that parody could
defeat a copyright claim on a motion to dismiss, because the court
needed only to compare the copyrighted work with the parody in order to
resolve the fair use issue.3
While copyright law gives broad rights of control over the creative
work itself, trademark law protects consumers from confusion about the
source of products. Given that, it might stand to reason that rejecting
legal attacks on parodies is even more straightforward under trademark
law; the interest of trademark law seems less connected to the
suppression of parody than does copyright law.
Nonetheless, courts have struggled with the evaluation of parody under
trademark law. While many trademark courts have protected parodies,
there are a surprising number of cases that hold obvious parodies illegal.4
Our goal in this Article is to understand why, and to think about what
circumstances (if any) should lead courts to find parody illegal. We
conclude that, despite increasing attention to speech interests in recent
years, the law’s treatment of parody reflects too much uncertainty,
leaving would-be parodists vulnerable to threats of legal action by
trademark holders. In particular, given the flexibility of likelihood of
confusion analysis, parodists’ fate is usually determined by the subjective
judgment of courts, whose treatment of parody often seems to turn on
instinct rather than trademark principles. We suggest some doctrinal
tools that offer greater predictability and quicker resolution of parody
cases, while avoiding some of the shortcomings of more traditional
infringement analysis.

2
510 U.S. 569, 576-94 (1994). Not all copyright cases protect parodies, however.
See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir.
1997).
3
Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2012).
4
See infra Part I.A (discussing cases).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170498

2013]

Parody as Brand
I.

475

PARODIES, BRAND PARODIES, AND THE LAW
A. Traditional Parodies

Parodies and their close kin, satires, are common in popular culture.
So, too, are lawsuits filed against those parodies by irate trademark
owners. Many of these cases involve classic examples of social
commentary using — and targeting — brands. Courts have applied a
variety of different theories to these cases, however.
One approach, first crafted by the Second Circuit in Rogers v.
Grimaldi, allows the use of trademarks in expressive works as long as
they have some artistic relevance to the work and do not explicitly
mislead as to source.5 Rogers itself involved the use of “Ginger and
Fred” as the title of a fictional film about two cabaret dancers whose act
— and nicknames — copied the famous dancers Fred Astaire and Ginger
Rogers. Ginger Rogers sued, claiming that the film violated her publicity
rights and falsely suggested her involvement in the film. The court
denied both claims, concluding that the First Amendment protects the
use of names in titles of expressive works “unless the title has no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic
relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the
content of the work.”6
Courts have adopted the Rogers test rather than likelihood of
confusion analysis in a variety of cases involving trademarks used in
expressive works. In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions,7 for
example, the defendant was an artist who posed Barbie dolls nude in
photographs in which they were attacked by vintage household
appliances. The artist did not use the term “Barbie” (or the doll itself) to
brand or sell goods; the art itself involved the trademarked doll, and the
titles8 reflected that fact. As with much modern art, what exactly the
artist was saying was not entirely clear, but it certainly seemed to be a
commentary on Barbie herself. The court found no liability for this
parody because the use of the term “Barbie” was “clearly relevant” to the
defendant’s work, and “d[id] not explicitly mislead as to the source of
the work.”9 In another Barbie case, the court invoked Rogers to allow the
5

875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id.
7
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
8
For example, “Malted Barbie,” which featured “a nude Barbie placed on a vintage
Hamilton Beach malt machine.” Id. at 796.
9
Id. at 807 (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir.
6
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use of “Barbie Girl” as the name of a song that poked fun at the plasticity
of the famous doll.10 And in E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star
Videos, Inc.,11 the plaintiff — the “Play Pen” strip bar — sued to stop the
depiction of a similar strip bar called the “Pig Pen” in the video game
Grand Theft Auto. Although the allusion to “Play Pen” was peripheral to
the video game’s central theme, the court found it sufficiently relevant to
the game’s expression to justify use of the mark, absent anything
explicitly misleading about the use.12
Other courts have reached similar results by reference to trademark
law’s standard likelihood of confusion test. In Hormel Foods Corp. v.
Jim Henson Productions, Inc.,13 for example, the court held that
defendant’s use of a character named “SPA’AM” in a Muppets movie
was a permissible parody of plaintiff’s “Spam” mark for potted meat.
The female, porcine “Spa’am” character was designed to make at least
some fun of Spam and its dubious relationship to more traditional forms
of meat. But the court did not apply any sort of speech or parody-related
test, instead finding that there was no likelihood of confusion or dilution
in the use.14
Not all classic parody cases turn out well for the defendants, however.
In Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak,15 the court held that
defendant’s antinuclear T-shirts, featuring a funny picture and the words
“Mutant of Omaha,” were likely to confuse consumers into thinking the
2002)).
10
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
11
547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).
12
See id. at 1100 (“[O]nly the use of a trademark with ‘no artistic relevance to the
underlying work whatsoever’ does not merit First Amendment protection . . . . In other
words, the level of relevance merely must be above zero.” (quoting MCA Records, Inc.,
296 F.3d at 902 and Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also
Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying Rogers to an
expressive, non-parodic use). But see Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452-58
(6th Cir. 2003) (finding question of fact as to whether song title “Rosa Parks” had any
artistic relevance to rap song that repeatedly suggested that competing rappers should
“move to the back of the bus”).
13
73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
14
Id. at 505-08; see also, e.g., Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48 (D.
Mass. 1993) (finding “Black Hog” and “Dead Dog” marks unlikely to be confused with
“Black Dog” trademark). Barton Beebe found that a parody defense is rarely asserted, but
when asserted tends to be successful. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1596 n.65 (2006)
[hereinafter Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests]; see also William McGeveran,
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 68-70 (2008).
15
836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987).
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insurance company “Mutual of Omaha” had sponsored the shirts.16 In
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications,17 the court found illegal a
fake advertisement in a humor magazine for “Michelob Oily,” a
purported new brand of beer. The ad was designed to make fun of both
brand differentiation and water pollution.18 In both cases, the court
accepted (dubious) evidence that consumers were likely to be confused
by the parodies despite their rather obvious parodic nature. In Deere &
Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,19 the court rejected a competing tractor
company’s use of the John Deere deer logo to attack the company in a
comparative advertisement.20 The court found the use to be dilutive
(perhaps by tarnishment, though the opinion suggests that the dilution
might have been something other than tarnishment).21 In any event, the
court thought that the fact that the Deere logo was being used to
advertise competing products was undesirable, distinguishing it from
uses for “worthy purposes of expression.”22 And in Coca-Cola Co. v.
Gemini Rising, Inc.,23 the court also proceeded on a tarnishment theory.
It held that a poster done in the style of a Coca-Cola ad that read “Enjoy
Cocaine” infringed Coca-Cola’s “Enjoy Coke” mark because it
associated plaintiff’s “wholesome beverage” with a “noxious substance”
like cocaine.24
16

Id. at 398-401.
28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994).
18
Id. at 773-77.
19
41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
20
Id. at 44-45.
21
Id. at 45 (“The commercial takes a static image of a graceful, full-size deersymbolizing Deere’s substance and strength-and portrays, in an animated version, a deer
that appears smaller than a small dog and scampers away from the dog and a lawn tractor,
looking over its shoulder in apparent fear. Alterations of that sort, accomplished for the
sole purpose of promoting a competing product, are properly found to be within New
York’s concept of dilution because they risk the possibility that consumers will come to
attribute unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with
inferior goods and services.”).
22
Id. at 44-45.
23
346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
24
Id. at 1189. This finding was particularly remarkable given that the name “CocaCola” derives from the soda’s inclusion of coca leaf derivatives more than a century ago.
See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1920) (“Before 1900
the beginning of the good will was more or less helped by the presence of cocaine, a drug
that, like alcohol of caffein or opium, may be described as a deadly poison or as a
valuable item of the pharmacopoeia according to the rhetorical purposes in view. The
amount seems to have been very small, but it may have been enough to begin a bad habit
and after the Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906, if not earlier, long before this suit was
17
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In our view, these cases illustrate a distinction that should be
categorical: a parody that makes fun of a trademark without adopting it
as a brand should not be actionable under trademark law. This includes
comparative advertising — poking fun at your competitor through a
tongue-in-cheek ad — as well as use in expressive products like books,
movies, T-shirts, or the like.25 We have emphasized elsewhere the role of
the trademark use doctrine in weeding out general trademark claims that
are not directed — as trademark law is supposed to be — at an effort to
brand or advertise products using a mark.26 Trademark use is a logical
filter to weed out cases that are about parodies featured in magazines,
movies, TV shows, Twitter feeds, or any of a variety of other uses that
don’t involve branding.27 While judicial adoption of a trademark use
brought, it was eliminated from the plaintiff’s compound.” (citations omitted)).
Ironically, Koke involved a claim that the Coca-Cola mark was deceptively
misdescriptive because it (now wrongly) suggested that the soda still contained cocaine.
25
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. i (1995) (suggesting
that parodies that don’t serve as brands “will often lie within the substantial constitutional
protection accorded noncommercial speech and may thus be the subject of liability only in
the most narrow of circumstances”).
26
See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1682 (2007) [hereinafter Grounding Trademark]
(“Strictly speaking, trademark infringement should require not only that a defendant be
using the mark to promote its own products or services but also that it be using it ‘as a
mark’-- i.e., to indicate the source or sponsorship of those products or services.”); Stacey
L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet,
41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 785 (2004) [hereinafter Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs].
Our work here is part of a larger debate over trademark use. For other work on the issue,
see, for example, Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of
“Trademark Use,” 39 UC DAVIS L. REV. 371, 376-87 (2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 1597 (2007); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law,
54 EMORY L.J. 507, 511-28 (2005); Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial
Interest Confusion, Consumer Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (2004); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of
Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773 [hereinafter Trademark Use].
27
There are an alarming number of such cases, some of them successful. See, e.g.,
Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998)
(enjoining a movie about a beauty contest in a rural state from using the title “Dairy
Queens”; the movie was eventually released as “Drop Dead Gorgeous”); Toho Co. v.
William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (enjoining a book about
Godzilla from using the title Godzilla!, despite the presence of disclaimers on both the
front and back covers). Other plaintiffs have failed, but the fact that the suits were
brought at all is worrisome. See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683
F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2012) (reversing conclusion that painter infringed university
trademarks by depicting actual university football games); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v.
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requirement has been uneven,28 trademark law has other tools to achieve
this result for defendants who don’t use their parody as a brand. The
Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (denying a strip
club’s infringement claim against a video-game manufacturer that included a like-named
strip club in its game); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923-24
(C.D. Ill. 2003) (refusing to enjoin a depiction of bulldozers that resembled the plaintiff’s
products in an animated film); Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp.
2d 1254, 1258, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (refusing to enjoin a depiction of a Slip-N-Slide
toy in a movie); Compagnie Générale des Établisessements Michelin & Michelin Cie v.
Nat’l Auto., Aerospace, Transp., and Gen. Workers Union of Can., [1997] 2 F.C. 306
(Can.), available at http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/1997/1997fc19917.html (refusing to
enjoin union from using the logo of the company it was trying to unionize as part of a
leafleting campaign).
28
Many courts adopting the trademark use doctrine have relied upon the “in
connection with” language in the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v.
Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding the appropriate inquiry in
evaluating the “in connection with” requirement, as “whether [defendant] offers
competing services to the public”); DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 936,
939 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he licensing of a toll-free telephone number, without more, is
not a ‘use’ within the meaning of the Lanham Act . . . .”); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800
Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623-26 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use of a
telephone number that translated into 1-800-H0LIDAY — with a zero in place of the “O”
— was not trademark “use” within the Lanham Act because the defendant had not
advertised its services under the offending alphabetical translation).
Others have relied on the “use in commerce” language. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc.
v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407-11 (2d Cir. 2005) (relying on the “use in
commerce” requirement to find no direct infringement by a party selling pop-up
advertisements); Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848,
855 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘[U]se in commerce’ appears to contemplate a trading upon the
goodwill of or association with the trademark holder.”); Site Pro-1, Inc. v. Better Metal,
LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (examining “[w]hether use of another
company’s registered trademark in metadata or as part of a sponsored search constitutes
use of a trademark in commerce under the Lanham Act”); Best W. Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No.
CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006) (affirming
summary judgment for infringement claim where “[plaintiff’s] complaint [did] not . . .
describe a single instance where [defendant’s] mark was improperly used”); cf. Hamzik
v. Zale Corp., No. 3:06-cv-1300, 2007 WL 1174863, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007)
(finding potential trademark use by a keyword advertiser that displayed plaintiff’s
trademark in the text of its ad).
Still others have held that the trademark use doctrine bars claims without specific
reference to statutory language. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,
478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting a state dilution claim because “Lycos might
profit by encouraging others to talk about UCS under the UCSY name, but neither that
speech nor Lycos’s providing a forum for that speech is the type of use that is subject to
trademark liability”); Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No.
C02-2420RSM, 2006 WL 3761367, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 2006) (holding that an
advertiser’s use of a keyword to generate a sponsored link to run a comparative
advertisement was not a trademark use for dilution purposes); see also Merck & Co. v.
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Trademark Dilution Revision Act makes it clear that parody cannot be
dilutive when it is used “other than as a designation of source.”29 As for
infringement, nominative fair use should protect comparative advertisers,
and Rogers v. Grimaldi addresses expressive works: as long as the use of
a trademark has some artistic relevance to an expressive product and
does not explicitly mislead as to source, trademark law should not
intervene.30 Using these doctrinal tools, we shouldn’t need to reach the
likelihood of confusion inquiry in order to resolve cases in which a clear
parody is used other than as a designation of source for a separate
commercial product.
Nor should the fact that a mark appears in the title of an expressive
work change the outcome. As Rogers v. Grimaldi instructs, trademarks
in titles should not infringe, as long as they bear some relationship to the

Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Finally, some courts, including more recent decisions in two courts of appeals, have
rejected the trademark use doctrine altogether. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 676
F.3d 144, 161-63 (4th Cir. 2012); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127-31
(2d Cir. 2009); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper, Inc., No. C03-5340 JF (RS), 2007
WL 1159950, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (holding that a search engine’s sale of
keyword-based advertising can constitute trademark use under the Lanham Act); Int’l
Profit Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676-80 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (enjoining
keyword advertising by a gripe site); Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC,
459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 321-24 (D.N.J. 2006) (allowing a trademark claim based on
keyword-based advertising); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273,
282-93 (D.N.J. 2006) (allowing trademark claims against a pay-for-priority search engine
based on its “sale” of keywords in exchange for prominent placement in search results);
Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064,
at *1-3 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (allowing a trademark claim based on keyword-based
advertising).
29
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2012). In any event, as we have argued elsewhere,
dilution generally requires that the defendant use the term as a mark. See Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 541, 542-44 (2008); see also Nat’l Bus.
Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 F.3d 526, 536 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding
that dilution statute requires defendant to use mark “in identifying or distinguishing its
own goods or services”).
30
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (Aqua’s song
“Barbie Girl” was a nominative use of Mattel’s Barbie mark because the song was about
Barbie). The question whether the defendant’s work is in fact about the plaintiff also
comes up in right of publicity cases. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437
(6th Cir. 2003) (finding genuine question of fact as to whether use of “Rosa Parks” as
song title was protected speech or violation of Parks’ Lanham Act and publicity rights);
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (considering both Lanham Act and right
of publicity claims).
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underlying expression and don’t lie.31 The speech interest in access to
expressive works extends to their titles; consumers, as well as creators,
benefit from a culture that allows subtle references and word play that
draws from a variety of cultural reference points.32 This is true even if
the use causes some level of confusion. As the Second Circuit pointed
out in Rogers:
[M]any titles with a celebrity’s name make no explicit statement
that the work is about that person in any direct sense; the
relevance of the title may be oblique and may become clear only
after viewing or reading the work. As to such titles, the
consumer interest in avoiding deception is too slight to warrant
application of the Lanham Act. Though consumers frequently
look to the title of a work to determine what it is about, they do
not regard titles of artistic works in the same way as the names
of ordinary commercial products. . . . [M]ost consumers are well
aware that they cannot judge a book solely by its title any more
than by its cover. We therefore need not interpret the Act to
require that authors select titles that unambiguously describe
what the work is about nor to preclude them from using titles
that are only suggestive of some topics that the work is not
about.33
In effect, Rogers does for expressive works what a robust trademark use
doctrine could do more generally: it takes judicial notice that certain uses
of trademarks (in expressive titles) don’t usually signal source, and
balances the slight risk of confusion against the benefits of allowing such
uses. We agree with the Second Circuit that parodies in expressive
31
A false statement of authorship or endorsement — such as “Jane Fonda’s Workout
Book” or “authorized biography” — would cross the line into misleading speech. “If such
explicit references were used in a title and were false as applied to the underlying work,
the consumer’s interest in avoiding deception would warrant application of the Lanham
Act, even if the title had some relevance to the work.” Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. But
absent such overt statements of affiliation, “the slight risk that such use of a celebrity’s
name might implicitly suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed
by the danger of restricting artistic expression, and the Lanham Act is not applicable.” Id.
at 1000.
32
E.g., Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. Afr. Breweries Int’l 2005 (1) SA 144 (CC)
at 64-65 para. 109 (S. Afr.) (Sachs, J., concurring) (“Humour is one of the great solvents
of democracy. It permits the ambiguities and contradictions of public life to be articulated
in non-violent forms. It promotes diversity. It enables a multitude of discontents to be
expressed in a myriad of spontaneous ways. It is an elixir of constitutional health.”).
33
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999-1000.
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products should generally be immune from liability, and we find it
heartening that recent parody decisions reflect a trend toward the Rogers
standard. From Ginger and Fred to Barbie Girl to Blender Barbie to the
Pig Pen, courts have sanctioned the use of trademarks both within the
works and in their titles.
Indeed, a closer look at the decisions that find parody infringing
suggests that one of three things is going on. First, some of these cases
are misled by poor evidence of confusion. In Balducci, for instance, only
6% of people surveyed thought that Michelob Oily was actually a new
kind of beer,34 but fully half of those surveyed understood that it was a
parody but thought that the humor magazine should have to get a
license.35 That may be a form of confusion — specifically, confusion
about what trademark law actually requires — but it is not confusion that
causes the sort of harm trademark law cares about, and it should not be
actionable.36 Similarly, in Mutual of Omaha, the plaintiff’s survey
showed that 42% of respondents thought the “Mutant of Omaha” shirt
“[called] to mind” Mutual of Omaha, and that 10% thought Mutual of
Omaha “[went] along” with the shirt.37 Those questions are not the ones
trademark law traditionally does or should care about.38 These cases are
misled by poor surveys or improper questions to find confusion where it
is in fact unlikely.
34

Suggesting that 6% of the country will believe absolutely anything.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1994).
36
See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 n.36 (1999) (making this critique of Balducci). See
generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV.
413 (2010) [hereinafter Irrelevant Confusion] (arguing that trademark law should
concentrate on confusion that may affect purchasing decisions); Rebecca Tushnet,
Running the Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1305 (2011) [hereinafter From A to B] (arguing that trademark law should
limit itself to confusion that actually matters to consumers). Rebecca Tushnet notes that
we increasingly see licenses for things that a generation ago we presumed no one would
license, including parodies. That does not mean, though, that parodies should require
licenses. See Rebecca Tushnet, Towards Symmetry in the Law of Branding, 21 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 971, 978-82 (2011).
37
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987).
38
Indeed, the problem is worse than that; the survey question itself planted the idea
of Mutual of Omaha’s acquiescence in respondents’ minds, asking: “Would you say that
Mutual of Omaha goes along or does not go along with these T-shirts in order to make
people aware of the nuclear war problem?” “Goes along” and “does not go along” were
the only choices offered; “is unaware of,” “has nothing to do with,” and “doesn’t much
care” apparently weren’t considered as possibilities. Id. at 400 n.5; see also id. at 403-04
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (criticizing the survey).
35
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Second, cases like Deere and Gemini are driven by a misunderstanding
of the nature of dilution. The evil of trademark dilution (if there is one)39
is that it weakens the association in the minds of consumers between the
brand and the product by introducing another association between a
different product and that brand.40 That’s not what’s happening in either
Deere or Gemini. Gemini didn’t involve product branding at all, and
accordingly wouldn’t be actionable under the federal dilution statute.
And the use in Deere was a commercial use of the mark, but not one that
branded the competitor’s goods; it used Deere’s mark to refer to Deere’s
goods. The courts in these cases seem to have misunderstood tarnishment
as saying something bad about the trademark owner, rather than its
proper meaning of branding your own inferior or noxious goods with the
plaintiff’s mark.41
The third factor that leads courts astray in these cases is a general
aversion to free riding. Some judges just don’t like it when people make
money from evoking someone else’s mark. In Hard Rock Cafe Licensing
Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, Inc.,42 for example, the defendant sold “Hard
39

While we have suggested elsewhere that dilution can increase search costs, at least
in theory, like many scholars we have some doubt about whether dilution is a harm worth
worrying about. Rebecca Tushnet, for example, has demonstrated that consumers can
handle linguistic clutter. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 527-46 (2008) [hereinafter Gone in Sixty
Milliseconds]. Paul Heald and Bob Brauneis have shown that sellers appear to have little
incentive to adopt famous trademarks as the name of non-competing products. Paul J.
Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of Trademark
Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2533, 2537 (2011). For
other articles questioning whether dilution should be actionable, see, for example, Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999); Kenneth L. Port, The
“Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?,
85 TRADEMARK REP. 525 (1995).
40
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 313
(2003) (contending that dilution law should limit itself to the loss of singularity of unique
marks).
41
Mark McKenna thinks that this is a problem with tarnishment itself. See Mark P.
McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67,
134-36 (2012) [hereinafter Consumer Decision-Making Theory]. But we think the two are
analytically separate: changing how a consumer feels about the plaintiff’s products is
different than associating those products with defendant’s noxious products in the minds
of consumers. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of
Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 65, 72 & n.26 (Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds.,
2007) [hereinafter A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines]; Tushnet, Gone in Sixty
Milliseconds, supra note 39, at 523-24.
42
776 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
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Rain Cafe” t-shirts in rain-plagued Seattle. After a cursory analysis
finding likelihood of confusion, the court rejected defendant’s parody
claim, concluding: “A defendant’s claim of parody will be disregarded
where the purpose of the similarity is to capitalize on a famous mark’s
popularity for the defendant’s own commercial use.”43
Trademark law, however, does not and should not aim to prevent all
free riding. The law targets harms that result from confusion and, at least
in theory,44 from the loss of singularity of particularly famous marks. 45
Parodies that conjure up a trademark for humor and turn a profit in the
process are engaged in perfectly lawful behavior, absent confusion or
dilution.
For traditional parodies, then, the legal rule should be simple, even if it
is not always followed: making fun of a trademark owner by doing
something other than using their mark to brand your own products does
not violate the Lanham Act.
B. Brand Parodies
Increasingly, however, we’ve witnessed a new phenomenon: lawsuits
against parodies that serve as brands, logos, or taglines for commercial
products.46 Haute Diggity Dog sells “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys, and Louis
Vuitton is not happy about it.47 Macy’s sells a diaper bag called “Gucchi
Goo,” and Gucci sues (and wins).48 The Utah tourism bureau describes
the state as having the “Greatest Snow on Earth,” a play on the Ringling
43
Id. at 1462 (citing Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1175 (C.D. Cal.
1986)); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“The difference between a ‘parody’ and a ‘knock-off’ is the difference between fun and
profit.”).
44
See sources cited supra note 39 and accompanying text.
45
See, e.g., Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44 (1st Cir.
2013) (“[A] trademark holder has no right to police ‘unnecessary’ use of its mark.
Whether necessary or not, a defendant’s use of a mark must be confusing in the relevant
statutory sense for a plaintiff to raise a viable infringement claim.” (emphasis in
original)); see also Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra
note 26, at 786-99.
46
A related but distinct phenomenon is the use of a corporate or personal name as the
title of a “fake” Facebook or Twitter account. This is impersonation, though not branding
per se. For discussion, see Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark
Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 851 (2010).
47
See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256
(4th Cir. 2007).
48
See Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839, 841 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
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Brothers’ “Greatest Show on Earth” mark.49 Black Bear Roastery sells
“Charbucks” coffee to poke fun at the famous brand’s dark roast while
cheekily offering its own dark-roast alternative.50 A Vermont hippie
invites people to “Eat More Kale,” and Chik-Fil-A thinks he’s making
fun of its “Eat Mor Chickin” mark.51 Hogg Wyld sells plus-size jeans
under the name Lardache, and jeans-maker Jordache is not amused.52 A
college student sells “South Butt” t-shirts with the tagline “Never Stop
Relaxing,” raising the ire of The North Face brand with its “Never Stop
Exploring” slogan.53 A bar owner names its kitschy establishment the
“Velvet Elvis,” and gets a visit from the King’s trademark attorneys.54
And so on.55
In many ways, this new form of parody resembles the old. It’s
motivated by a desire to comment or criticize, and it’s unlikely to
confuse anyone about the source of the parody-branded product.56 In
49
See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999).
50
See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir.
2009). See generally What It’s All About?, BLACK BEAR MICRO ROASTERY,
https://blackbearcoffee.com/Starbucks/What%27s_it_all_about.htm (last visited Sept. 11,
2013) (offering Black Bear’s account of the reason for its choices of name).
51
See James Lantz et al., A Defiant Dude, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/
projects/1674889308/a-defiant-dude (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
52
See Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1483-84 (10th Cir.
1987).
53
See Kelsey Volkmann, South Butt vs. North Face, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (Oct. 16, 2010),
http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/blog/2009/09/south_butt_vs_north_face.html.
The
defendant was ultimately enjoined in a consent judgment and held in contempt of that
judgment for selling a separate T-shirt that read “The Butt Face.” See North Face Apparel
Corp. v. Williams Pharmacy Inc., No. 4:09-CV-02029-RWS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145987, at *1-9 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2012).
54
See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191-93 (5th Cir. 1998).
55
See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d
490 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Spy Notes” not infringing “Cliff Notes”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
VIP Prods., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (“Buttwiper” dog toy likely to be
confused with “Budweiser” beer-related products); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v.
Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Timmy Holedigger” pet
perfume not likely to be confused with “Tommy Hilfiger” perfume); Grey v. Campbell
Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (“Dogiva” dog biscuits infringe “Godiva”
chocolate mark), aff’d, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987). And even more brand parodies have
flown under the radar, like the baby shirt that reads “iPood.”
56
The lines between the two types of parody also blur as trademark owners arrogate
to themselves the right to control secondary markets for the sale of T-shirts, memorabilia,
and the like. The use of a brand on a T-shirt is classically an expressive use, but
trademark owners (and some courts) have increasingly treated this merchandising as a
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other ways, however, parody as brand differs from parody as product
because the parody is being used as an indicator of source. Building a
brand name around someone else’s trademark looks, to some observers,
like a classic case of “free riding,” with the parodist taking advantage of
the allure of the targeted brand. Trademark holders, not surprisingly,
abhor the practice and sue to prevent it.
But trademark law is not — and has never been — about preventing all
forms of free riding.57 Trademark law, even as it has expanded to prevent
dilution, has purported to focus on preventing harm, either to the
trademark holder or to the public (and sometimes to both). Those who
develop brands-as-parody may well be benefiting from the appeal of a
famous brand, but if their use is an effective parody, it doesn’t cause the
kind of harm that trademark law is designed to address. These brands-asparody, moreover, offer a valuable form of social commentary. Even
more than non-commercial forms of parody, the subversive use of a
parody as brand invites critical reflection on the role of brands in society
and the extent to which we define ourselves by them.58
Brands that parody, in other words, offer a unique platform for
expression and pose little threat to trademark law’s core values. As a
matter of doctrine, however, the fact that a parody is also a brand
complicates the trademark analysis. The trademark use doctrine is no
longer a bar to an infringement suit; Black Bear is in fact using the term
“Charbucks” as a mark to brand its products. Nominative use becomes
harder, though not impossible, for the same reason. “Charbucks” is in
fact nominative use in a sense; buyers presumably understand that it is a
reference to Starbucks. But it is not only a nominative use; it is
simultaneously a brand in its own right, and if it is memorable it may
form of branding within the trademark owner’s control. For criticism of this
phenomenon, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right:
Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005) [hereinafter Merchandising
Right]; Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137
(2010) [hereinafter Owning Mark(et)s].
57
For discussion, see, for example, Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra
note 56; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005).
58
See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489
(2006) [hereinafter Semiotic Disobedience] (discussing brand parodies as a form of
cultural disobedience); Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in
Trademark and Advertising Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 891-95 (2011) (noting special
need of commentators to access expressive aspects of visual marks); cf. Deven R. Desai,
From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 999-1009 (2012) [hereinafter From
Trademarks to Brands] (exploring personal role of brands in culture).
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serve the traditional function of cementing Black Bear’s product in
people’s minds.59 When a parody is also a brand, a number of courts
have concluded that the analysis is the same as it is for any other
trademark case: we ask whether confusion or dilution is likely, and if it
is, the use is unlawful.60 In other words, those courts do not give parody a
defense or any special treatment.
Perhaps it doesn’t matter. Most parodies are unlikely to confuse
consumers or to dilute the singularity of a famous trademark.61 Black
Bear customers who buy Charbucks coffee presumably understand that
they are not buying coffee at a Starbucks; they also seem unlikely to
think that Starbucks has authorized a new, self-parodying blend and let
Black Bear sell it. Nor does Charbucks make Starbucks less distinctive as
a brand of its own; to the contrary, it only enhances Starbucks’ fame. The
same goes for The Greatest Snow on Earth and Ringling Brothers, or
Chewy Vuiton dog toys and Louis Vuitton. So maybe we don’t need a
defense to protect brand parodies; they will take care of themselves.
That answer seems unsatisfactory, and not merely because some brand
parodies are in fact held illegal under questionable circumstances.62
59
For this reason, courts have given lower First Amendment protection to parodic
brands than to other forms of trademark parodies. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger Licensing,
221 F. Supp. 2d at 415-16 (“When a parodist makes trademark use of another’s mark, it
should be entitled to less indulgence, even if this results in some residual effect on the
free speech rights of commercial actors.”).
60
See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405
(9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he claim of parody is not really a separate ‘defense’ . . . but merely a
way of phrasing the traditional response that customers are not likely to be confused as to
the source, sponsorship or approval.”); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, 221 F. Supp. 2d at
415-16 (applying traditional likelihood of confusion analysis to case involving brand
parody). The leading treatise endorses this position:

Some parodies will constitute an infringement, some will not. But the cry of
“parody!” does not magically fend off otherwise legitimate claims of trademark
infringement or dilution. There are confusing parodies and non-confusing
parodies. All they have in common is an attempt at humor through the use of
someone else’s trademark. A non-infringing parody is merely amusing, not
confusing.
6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
31:153 (4th ed. 2013).
61
For discussion of the likelihood of confusion test as applied to parodies, see David
A. Simon, The Confusion Trap: Rethinking Parody in Trademark Law, 88 WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter The Confusion Trap].
62
See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., 666 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Mo.
2008) (finding “Buttwiper” T-shirts likely to be confused with “Budweiser” brand);
Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting a
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Confusion is a fact-specific inquiry, often heavily reliant on manipulable
survey evidence and subject to an ever-expanding notion of what it takes
to confuse.63 If confusion over whether the defendant needed a license is
actionable, then virtually any brand evocation invites an expensive and
unpredictable trial.64 Even if the law could guarantee the right result at
trial, many parodists are small companies without the will or resources to
fight a case all the way to trial.65 Many will cave in and abandon their
parodies rather than hire a lawyer.
Dilution presents a different problem for brand parodies. While there is
an explicit defense for parody in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, it
expressly applies only to parodies that use the mark “other than as a
designation of source.”66 Brand parodies, by contrast, do not benefit from
the defense. That doesn’t mean they are dilutive, of course; the Fourth
Circuit found in Louis Vuitton that Chewy Vuiton was not. But it does
mean that the parody is to be evaluated under the normal standards of
blurring or tarnishment, a set of fact-intensive standards that map poorly
preliminary injunction on use of “Gucchi Goo” mark on diaper bags because mark could
be confused with “Gucci” brand). Bill McGeveran suggested to us that this is changing,
and that more recent cases are more favorable to parodies. But that’s not universally true,
as Starbucks demonstrates. See also PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. Thread Pit, Inc.,
Cancelation No. 92047436, at 15 (T.T.A.B. 2012) (canceling clothing mark that depicted
a polo player falling off a horse as likely to confuse consumers of the Polo brand, noting
“parody is not a defense if the marks are otherwise confusingly similar”).
63
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), for
example, the court found infringement by the “Michelob Oily” parody, reversing the
district court on likelihood of confusion, because even though only 6% of the public
thought Michelob Oily was a new brand of beer, “over half” of respondents “thought
Balducci needed Anheuser-Busch’s approval to publish the ad.” Id. at 775. In doing so,
the court added a consumer’s misunderstanding of the law to the kinds of confusion
apparently actionable under the Lanham Act. See also Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of
Boca, 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding high degrees of confusion based
on survey that asked consumers whether they thought trademark holder’s permission was
required for “Dom Popignon” popcorn); cf. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co.,
746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting survey that asked leading question about whether
Donkey Kong manufacturer needed permission from the owner of the King Kong mark).
64
See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 36, at 436-39.
65
For discussion of this problem, see, for example, James Gibson, Risk Aversion and
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007). For application
to trademark parody cases, see Regina Schaffer-Goldman, Cease and Desist:
Tarnishment’s Blunt Sword in Its Battle Against the Unseemly, the Unwholesome, and the
Unsavory, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1241 (2010). Cf. Bruce P.
Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic Than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits
Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 995-97 (2004) (copyright cases).
66
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
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to uses expressly intended to evoke a famous mark.67 The statutory
factors focus on the strength and fame of the plaintiff’s mark and the
possibility of association between the two marks.68 While some might
worry about brands that draw strength from association with a famous
mark,69 in the context of parody we should expect that the defendant both
targets famous marks and does so by creating an association between the
mark and the parody. Indeed, that’s the essence of parody. Brand
parodies, then, simply don’t fit comfortably with the statutory dilution
factors. It isn’t that the blurring factors necessarily make brand parodies
unlawful, though many of them may be primed to line up in favor of the
trademark owner, but rather that the questions the statute asks are largely
tangential to the issues that matter in evaluating a parody.
Unlike blurring, the statute is largely silent on what dilution by
tarnishment means. We have argued elsewhere that courts must
distinguish between a defendant’s use that tarnishes by associating the
brand name with the defendant’s noxious product (actionable) and a
defendant’s use that “tarnishes” because it disparages the plaintiff’s
product (not actionable).70 On this view, parody will generally not be
dilution by tarnishment, except by accident. The point of a parody is to
target the plaintiff’s work. Even a branded parody is aimed primarily at
making fun of the plaintiff’s work, not at marketing unrelated products
that are shoddy or offensive. That doesn’t mean a brand parody can
never tarnish,71 but courts must be careful not to confuse making fun of
the plaintiff with tarnishing.

67

See id. A rote application of the statutory factors for dilution by blurring will
almost always result in a finding in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v.
Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 105-10 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that all
but one of the statutory blurring factors weighed in favor of plaintiff).
68
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
69
But see sources cited supra note 39 and accompanying text.
70
See Dogan & Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines, supra note
41, at 72 & n.26.
71
The most likely context in which a brand parody could tarnish is when the “parody”
appears on pornographic or drug-related products. Courts appear to be moving toward a
presumption of tarnishment when a seller of such services adopts a mark that evokes a
famous brand. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir.
2010) (adopting “a kind of rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong inference, that a
new mark used to sell sex-related products is likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a
clear semantic association between the two”). We have our doubts about this precedent,
especially to the extent that it reaches marks that evoke, without replicating, the famous
brand. See, e.g., Dogan, supra note 40 (criticizing precedent that finds tarnishment based on
mere evocation of famous brands). For a critique of the presumption that a relationship with
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Brand parodies, then, don’t fit well within existing trademark
infringement or dilution law. Parodies generally don’t confuse
consumers, and because they refer back to the plaintiff’s mark directly
they will not generally blur or tarnish that mark in the way dilution law
prohibits. True parodies thus cause none of the harms that trademark law
seeks to avoid. But because neither law is structured with parodies in
mind, rote application of infringement and dilution standards can result
in a condemnation of even obvious parodies. Lacking tools specifically
designed for parody, courts treat it in an ad hoc way that reflects their
own subjective assessment of the value or parody and the morality of
free rides. The fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, moreover, means a
long and costly process, which alone may deter parodies.72
The solution, we believe, lies in a more consistent and predictable
approach to brand parodies under both infringement and dilution law. In
contrast to copyright law, we have seen little convergence in the courts’
treatment of even basic questions involving trademark parodies. Given

sex tarnishes, see Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property, 23
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 119 (2012). If the growing presumption holds, however, we can
imagine it applying to some arguably parodic brands. The use of “Live American Girl
Dolls” on a strip club, for example, may constitute tarnishment, even if it was adopted in
part as a sarcastic commentary on the wholesome image of the famous doll label. Similarly,
consider Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1979), involving a porn movie from the 1970’s, called “Debbie Does Dallas,” that
depicts the star in a Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders outfit in one scene. Id. at 202-03. Under
Rogers v. Grimaldi there is surely artistic relevance, and the comment on the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders as selling sexuality seems pretty obvious. At the same time, one can
imagine why the Dallas Cowboys viewed the association as tarnishing. Still other examples
of arguable parodies that may tarnish because of their offensive or sexual content include
the sale of hats labeled “Cuntier” that imitate the “Cartier” brand, see Misty White Sidell,
New Cartier Spoof Finds Itself in Hot Water with the Brand, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/08/new-cartier-spoof-finds-itself-in-hotwater-with-the-brand.html, and singer Chubby Checker’s suit against a company that
supplied a penis-size calculation app for a mobile phone that it called “The Chubby
Checker.” See Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C 13-02477 WHA, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115856, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013). Full disclosure: Lemley’s firm
represents the defendant in this case.
As in copyright cases, part of the challenge is to determine how much of the use owes
itself to critical commentary, and how much is simply a convenient way to capture
attention through use of someone else’s mark. If the commentary is insignificant and the
use is likely to tarnish the famous mark through dual association with an unsavory
product, then the balance may tilt in favor of the trademark holder. But where it is the
commentary that the trademark owner objects to, the law should not give the trademark
owner the power to restrict that commentary.
72
On the problem of in terrorem settlements in IP cases, see Gibson, supra note 65.
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the increasing prevalence of parody as brand, the time has come for a
more considered analysis that balances legitimate (or at least plausible)
trademark holder concerns against the public’s interest in this form of
critical speech.
II.

THE VALUE OF BRAND PARODIES

Whether or not they believe that a particular parody deserves legal
protection, courts and commentators seem to agree that parody has social
value as critical speech. As the Supreme Court has explained, “Like less
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody] can provide social
benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating
a new one.”73 Parodies make us think while making us chuckle; they
offer a funny and often biting lens through which to view our cultural
icons. From Henry Fielding’s “Shamela”74 to Alice Randall’s “The Wind
Done Gone,”75 from Tina Fey’s parody of Sarah Palin76 to the Simpsons’
cracks about “Mapple,”77 parodies have, for centuries, had an “unerring
ability both to delight and to confound.”78
Despite their general appreciation of parody, however, courts show
distinctly less enthusiasm for parodies that serve as brands. To some
extent, their objection is doctrinal: both First Amendment and trademark
jurisprudence give special status to non-commercial speech.79 But the
73

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also L.L.
Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987).
74
See generally CONNY KEYBER, AN APOLOGY FOR THE LIFE OF MRS. SHAMELA
ANDREWS (1741) (writing under a pseudonym, Henry Fielding presents a parody of
SAMUEL RICHARDSON, PAMELA (1740)).
75
See generally ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2001) (presenting a parody
of MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936)).
76
E.g., SNL Tina Fey then Gov. Palin, YOUTUBE (Oct. 28, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IE-OCDexYrU.
77
See The Simpsons — Steve Mobs, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=CZGIn9bpALo.
78
LINDA HUTCHEON, A THEORY OF PARODY: THE TEACHINGS OF TWENTIETHCENTURY ART FORMS, at xvii (2000 ed. 1985). See generally SIMON DENTITH, PARODY
(John Drakakis ed., 2000) (exploring historical role of parody); MARGARET A. ROSE,
PARODY: ANCIENT, MODERN, AND POST-MODERN (Richard Macksey & Michael Sprinker
eds., 1993) (examining theories and uses of parody from ancient to contemporary times);
UNIV. PRESS, THE OXFORD BOOK OF PARODIES (John Gross ed., 2010) (same).
79
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415-16
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), for example, found no likelihood of confusion between “Timmy
Holedigger” dog perfume and “Tommy Hilfiger” people perfume, but noted that because
the parody was serving as a brand, it was not entitled to any special First Amendment
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trouble with brand parodies transcends doctrine; courts seem to struggle
over their own intuitions about whether a defendant’s commercial
objectives undermine its speech interest in the parody.80 Given the
malleability of confusion and dilution analysis, these judicial instincts
often dictate the outcome in trademark litigation.81
Yet there’s a strong argument that, at least in the trademark context,
incorporating a parody into a brand serves expressive goals that could
not be realized through ordinary, non-branding speech. Many — perhaps
most — branding parodies have a doubly subversive message. They are
using a brand not only to lampoon the targeted brand, but also to call
attention to the pervasiveness of branding in our society. Parodies, in
general, replicate the central features of a particular work to “reference
and ridicule” the work.82 Brand parodies do more: they not only borrow
from the trademark itself, but they also appropriate the device of
branding and employ it to make us think critically about the role of
brands in our culture. The dog chew toy in Louis Vuitton, for example,
“pokes fun at the elegance and expensiveness of a LOUIS VUITTON
handbag” but also “irreverently presents haute couture as an object for
casual canine destruction.”83 Or so thought the Fourth Circuit, at least.84
treatment and instead required analysis under the likelihood of confusion test. See also
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding no
dilution in part because defendant “did not use Bean’s marks to identify or promote
goods or services to consumers; it never intended to market the ‘products’ displayed in
the parody”); cf. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
“Barbie Girl” as title of song non-commercial speech because, in addition to its
commercial purpose of selling the song, “the song also lampoons the Barbie image and
comments humorously on the cultural values Aqua claims she represents”).
80
See, e.g., Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pac. Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp.
1454 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (“[D]efendant’s claim of parody will be disregarded where the
purpose of the similarity is to capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for the
defendant’s own commercial use.”); cf. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d
1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The difference between a ‘parody’ and a ‘knock-off’ is the
difference between fun and profit.”).
This is not a problem limited to parodies. Courts have stretched to find defendant’s
uses to be commercial, and therefore infringing, when they think the defendant stands to
make money from their use, even when it seems otherwise clearly noninfringing. See
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004);
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2001).
81
See Greg Lastowka, Trademark’s Daemons, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 790 (2011)
(“The test for infringement provides a wonderful smokescreen for a jurist’s hidden
agenda.”); see also Beebe, Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests, supra note 14, at
1614-16.
82
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
83
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 261 (4th
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Trademark holders, of course, would prefer not to face this kind of
ridicule of their brands or their branding practices. But trademark law
does not exist to suit the needs of trademark holders; it aims to promote
broader social objectives. As a result, whether or not trademark law
should condemn brand parodies depends on whether they threaten
trademark law’s normative goals.
We have written elsewhere about the rationale for — and the costs of
— laws protecting trademarks.85 Despite an active contemporary debate
over its descriptive accuracy and desirability,86 the dominant theoretical
justification for trademarks remains an economic one. By providing
shorthand signals about products, trademarks lower the costs of
transferring information between buyers and sellers. By protecting the
integrity of this product information, trademark law can facilitate more
transparent and competitive markets.
This account, however, comes with two important caveats. First,
because fair competition remains the ultimate goal of trademark law, the
law’s information-related objectives must sometimes give way to
competition concerns. Trademark rules like functionality, fair use (both
descriptive and nominative), and genericide are all designed to promote
competition and market access, even when it means losing some
informational clarity for consumers.87 Second, even the most modest
version of trademark law — say, one focused only on passing off —
creates the opportunity for rent-seeking behavior and the risk of
monopoly.88 While trademarks do convey objective information about

Cir. 2007).
84
Id.; see also Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1993)
(“[S]ome purchasers might resent paying a premium to be a walking billboard and would
relish the opportunity to mock trendy folks who wear labels on their sleeves.”).
85
See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines, supra
note 41 (discussing rationale and costs of trademark laws); Dogan & Lemley, Grounding
Trademark, supra note 26 (same); Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 56
(same); Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 26
(same).
86
See Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 60, 67-77 (2008); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1896-916 (2007); Jeremy N. Sheff, The (Boundedly)
Rational Basis of Trademark Liability, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 333 (2007).
87
For more detail on these and other competition-oriented limiting doctrines, see
generally Deven R. Desai, An Information Approach to Trademarks, 100 GEO. L.J. 2119
(2012) [hereinafter Information Approach to Trademarks]; Dogan & Lemley, A SearchCosts Theory of Limiting Doctrines, supra note 41.
88
See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke?
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products, they can also serve as vessels of advertising-laden prestige,
status, and brand personality that often bear little relation to any
objective measure of product quality.89 This kind of artificial product
differentiation can lead to higher prices and deadweight loss.90 Whether
we view this as a fundamental problem or a minor glitch in the system, it
is an inevitable effect of trademark protection, and it raises real economic
concerns.
As trademark law grows increasingly immodest — by protecting
product designs against fears of post-sale confusion, for instance — these
costs associated with trademark protection grow.91 Producers can now
differentiate their products not only through names, but also through
their “branded” product attributes. Luxury brands, in particular, thrive on
the very fact of their scarcity and its attendant high price. Consumers
demand these brands at least in part because of the image of distinction
and wealth that they convey. Product use and consumption, in turn,
become a form of expression, in which wearers or users of luxurybranded products project to the world their exalted status.92 Wearing,
consuming, or riding in a luxury-branded product conveys a very public
message about the consumer’s affluence and values.
Our goal here is not to pass judgment on these economic and cultural
phenomena. Whether one believes that brand-based product
differentiation promotes social welfare or reduces it,93 it undeniably
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2059-66 (2012); Lunney,
supra note 39, at 367-69 (describing intellectual, political, and legal history of trademark
law, including early debates over the tension between its informational objectives and its
monopolistic tendencies).
89
See Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 792 (2012)
[hereinafter Veblen Brands].
90
See Ann Bartow, Counterfeits, Copying and Class, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 707, 707-08
(2011); Sheff, Veblen Brands, supra note 89, at 825.
91
See Lunney, supra note 39, at 421-39; Sheff, Veblen Brands, supra note 89, at 818.
92
See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 809, 821-24 (2010) [hereinafter Sumptuary Code]. For a celebration of this fact,
see Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 282 (2013).
93
Cf. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 92 (suggesting that luxury brands play the
role of a modern “sumptuary code” that distinguishes high-class from low-class
citizenry). Compare Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for
Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007) (contending that
prestige goods can actually enhance consumer welfare by offering a host of non-physical
attributes that bring utility to consumers), with Lunney, supra note 39 (claiming that
property-based trademark protection reduces social welfare), and Sheff, Veblen Brands,
supra note 89 (contending that legal protection of luxury brands is unnecessary and
harmful to consumer interests).
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plays a major role in our economy and our society. Brands shape our
communities and define our values. And while the traditional economic
account views brands as conveying information unidirectionally — from
producer to consumer — brands also convey information about the
consumer and allow members of the public to communicate to each
other.94 By selling branded products, producers enable us to brand
ourselves. Indeed, in the modern world of luxury brands this is arguably
the primary function of brands. Traditional trademarks serve as the
source of goods and therefore protect the customer from fake goods. By
contrast, Nike swooshes, red shoe bottoms, and Chanel purse logos are
not really about ensuring purchasers make the right decision, but about
allowing purchasers to tell the rest of the world about that decision. Were
it otherwise, known counterfeits wouldn’t be so popular.95 Brands, then,
don’t just help trademark owners speak; they help all of us speak. And
that speech is so common that refusing to wear brand names is itself a
recognized counter-cultural statement.96
Which brings us back to brand parody. As discussed above, brands that
parody have a dual target: the brand itself and the phenomenon of
branding. Given the prevalence of branding and its economic and social
impact, commentary about both brands and branding is a matter of public
concern.97 If they succeed in the market, moreover, these parodic brands
94

See Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, supra note 58, at 1036-44; see also Desai,
Information Approach to Trademarks, supra note 87, at 2120-21 (contending that
trademarks should be understood as information channels).
95
Cf. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993)
(“Where trademarks once served only to tell the consumer who made the product, they
now often enhance it or become a functional part of it.”).
96
See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (1999) (recounting popular movements designed
to counter the message of dominant brands by, among other things, exposing brand
hypocrisy); MC LARS, NO LOGO (Horris Records & Oglio Records 2009) (mocking the
mocking of brand hypocrisy). See generally Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation
and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341 (2011) [hereinafter The Law of
Reputation] (noting broader community interest in the construction of individual and
corporate reputation); McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 41
(suggesting that persuasive, non-deceptive uses of marks by third parties can have social
value). For a discussion of the act of subverting the meaning of a brand as itself speechsignificant, see Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, supra note 58, at 554-68.
97
See, e.g., Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. Afr. Breweries Int’l 2005 (1) SA 144
(CC) at 62 para. 105 (S. Afr.) (Sachs, J., concurring) (“The companies that own famous
trademarks exert substantial influence over public and political issues, making them and
their marks ripe and appropriate targets for parody and criticism.”); Deven R. Desai,
Speech, Citizenry, and the Market, 98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/Paper%20PDF/Desai,%20Deven%
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most likely do so because they offer some value to consumers — because
their message resonates with a substantial audience. Just as prestige
brands confer value to consumers who want to project an image of
exclusivity, so brand parodies bring utility to consumers seeking to
project a more rebellious or sardonic message.98 Absent some harm to
the informational function of the underlying trademark, the availability
of this new type of product likely increases social welfare.99 Further, if
brands are part of a conversation between consumers, not just with
trademark owners, brand parodies allow others to participate in that
conversation with a different, unapproved message.100 In so doing, it
helps us define ourselves. As Salman Rushdie put it, “[t]hose who do not
have power over the story that dominates their lives, power to retell it,
rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about it, and change it as times change,
truly are powerless, because they cannot think new thoughts.”101
If the parody is effective, moreover — if consumers get the joke — it’s
20-%20Paper.pdf (“Like other public figures, corporations affect public affairs, take
political positions, engage in matters of public concern and public controversy, and have
reputations.”).
98
They also make life more fun by adding some levity to our lives. As Justice Sachs
of the South African Constitutional Court proclaimed, in a case involving a parody of a
beer brand:
The Constitution cannot oblige the dour to laugh. It can, however, prevent the
cheerless from snuffing out the laughter of the blithe spirits among us. Indeed,
if our society became completely solemn because of the exercise of state power
at the behest of the worthy, not only would all irrelevant laughter be
suppressed, but temperance considerations could end up placing beer-drinking
itself in jeopardy. And I can see no reason in principle why a joke against the
government can be tolerated, but one at the expense of what used to be called
Big Business, cannot.
Laugh It Off Promotions (1) SA at 63-64 para. 107 (Sachs, J., concurring).
99
To be precise, the parodist and the people who view the parody generally benefit.
There may be individuals who value the purity of brand integrity and oppose parody for
its own sake. A utilitarian calculus would have to include their preferences too. See
Manta, supra note 92, at 261. But we are skeptical that the views of these few people are
so strongly held that they will outweigh the value of parody to others, including the
parodist.
100
See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1585
(1993) (arguing that courts choose encouraging accurate communication over
maximizing returns to trademark owners).
101
SALMAN RUSHDIE, One Thousand Days in a Balloon, reprinted in SALMAN
RUSHDIE: A POSTMODERN READING OF HIS MAJOR WORKS 104 (Sabrina Hassumani ed.,
2002).
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hard to see how brand parodies pose any cognizable threat to trademark
law’s informational goals. Sure, the public might think less of the
trademark holder as a result of the criticism, but trademark law has never
addressed itself to that kind of harm.102 To the contrary, the fact that the
defendant is using the plaintiff’s brand to talk about the plaintiff, even
for money, is a defense to infringement.103
Brand parodies, then, are a natural and desirable part of a social
conversation that takes place through the phenomenon of branding.
Trademark owners benefit from that conversation, but they are not the
only ones with a right to speak.
III. A DEFENSE FOR BRAND PARODIES
True brand parodies thus have social value and are unlikely to cause
confusion or loss of distinctiveness of the targeted mark; trademark
courts should rarely enjoin them. In practice, however, litigation against
brand parodies can drag on for years, with courts equivocating over what
rules to apply and how.104 And some courts enjoin them based on
questionable evidence of confusion. Both the equivocation and the
misapplication of the law may well result from discomfort over the
commercial nature of these parodies, or from a perception of exploitation
and free riding. Whatever the cause, the slipperiness of trademark
doctrine gives courts room to find infringement or dilution, even under
dubious circumstances, if they are motivated to do so.
We need more reliable protection for brand parodies under both
trademark infringement and dilution law. A defense that can be litigated
pre-trial would add great certainty to the process and protect speech.
Even contemplating such a defense, however, raises a host of definitional
and policy questions. What is parody, and why should we privilege it
over other forms of critical speech such as satire? How should courts
distinguish between real parodies and fakes? Assuming parody deserves
some kind of legal protection, what form should the defense take?
Should the defense be absolute once it is established that the defendant’s
brand is in fact a qualifying parody? Or should a brand parody be illegal
102

See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217-18 (3d
Cir. 2005); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992).
104
The Charbucks case, for example, has been up and down to the Second Circuit
three times in the nine years it has been litigated so far, and there is no end in sight. See
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 102-05 (2d Cir. 2009).
103
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if it causes enough confusion? We see no easy answer to these questions;
in particular, we recognize the hazards of distinguishing between
parodies and other forms of critical speech. Nonetheless, we believe that
there is good reason to provide special protection for parodies, while at
the same time preserving space for satire and other expressive uses of
marks. The difficulty of drawing lines should not prevent us from
protecting parodies that are clearly on the right side of the line, wherever
drawn.
A. What Is a Parody? Does It Matter?
To create a defense for brand parodies, we need either a definition of
what a parody is or a general principle that encompasses brand parodies
along with other forms of protected uses of a trademark.
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,105 a copyright fair use case, the
Supreme Court sought to define parody. While it drew from classic and
dictionary definitions a fairly broad definition of a parody that involved
imitation of a work for the purpose of comic effect,106 the actual
definition it adopted was narrower: “[T]he use of some elements of a
prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part,
comments on that author’s works.”107 Works that use elements from an
original for comic effect but that do not comment directly on the original,
by contrast, are classed by the Court as satire, not parody. The court
reasoned that parody needs the original in order to work, but satire could
use any work, not necessarily the plaintiff’s.108
105

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Id. at 579-80 (“The germ of parody lies in the definition of the
Greek parodeia, quoted in Judge Nelson’s Court of Appeals dissent, as ‘a song sung
alongside another.’ Modern dictionaries accordingly describe a parody as a ‘literary or
artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect
or ridicule,’ or as a ‘composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of
thought and phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in such a way as to make
them appear ridiculous.’” (citations omitted)).
107
Id. at 580.
108
Id. at 580-81 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has
some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination,
whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act
of borrowing.”). In fact, however, there may be non-parodic uses that depend on a
particular work. Machinima, for instance, makes videos out of content from individual
video games, and fan fiction builds off of books or movies. While in theory the fan could
build off of some other work, the entire point of machinima or fan fiction is to pay
homage to a particular piece of culture. See Michael Choe, The Problem of the ParodySatire Distinction: Fair Use in Machinima and Other Fan Created Works, 37 RUTGERS
106
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Campbell emphatically did not say that parody was protected and
satire was not. Indeed, it strongly suggested that both satire and parody
had claims to be fair use under copyright law where they did not
substitute for the original goods.109 But in the wake of Campbell, many
courts in copyright and trademark cases have treated the parody/satire
distinction not as a point of discussion, but as a bright line rule. Most
notably, the Ninth Circuit in Dr. Seuss held that because The Cat NOT In
the Hat was a satire, not a parody of Dr. Seuss’s books, it was neither
copyright fair use nor speech protected from trademark infringement.110
The result is that under existing law, there is a substantial benefit to
having your work classed as a parody rather than a satire.111 For many of
the examples we discussed in Part I, this is generally not an issue; most
are pretty clearly targeting the brand owner at least in part. But other
cases that clearly make reference to a trademark owner seem closer to
satire — social commentary — than a parody of the trademark itself. In
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,112 the court held that a
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 114-16 (2011).
109
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 n.14 (“[W]hen there is little or no risk of market
substitution, whether because of the large extent of transformation of the earlier work, the
new work’s minimal distribution in the market, the small extent to which it borrows from
an original, or other factors, taking parodic aim at an original is a less critical factor in the
analysis, and looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as may satire with
lesser justification for the borrowing than would otherwise be required.”). By contrast,
Justice Kennedy was alone in concluding that the court’s analysis should be limited to
parody and should not extend to satire. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is not
enough that the parody use the original in a humorous fashion, however creative that
humor may be. The parody must target the original, and not just its general style, the
genre of art to which it belongs, or society as a whole . . . .”).
110
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405-06 (9th
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he claim of parody is no defense ‘where the purpose of the similarity is to
capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for the defendant’s own commercial use.’”
(citation omitted)). For trenchant criticism of this decision, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr.
Seuss, the Juice, and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 546, 585-633 (1998). For a contrary approach, see Blanch v. Koons, 467
F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006). See also MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 23-44 (2012); Rebecca Tushnet, Scary
Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups, and Other Illegitimate Children, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2133, 2139 (2011).
111
Indeed, several copyright cases bend over backwards to find parody in what is
really some other form of commentary or criticism. See, e.g., Northland Family Planning
Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (edit of
pro-choice video to intersperse anti-choice arguments was a “parody”; parody doesn’t
need to be humorous).
112
811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
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pornography magazine that published a fake catalog called “L.L. Beam’s
Back to School Sex Catalog” was a lawful parody of L.L. Bean’s Back to
School Catalog.113 Whatever commentary the Back to School Sex
Catalog might be making doesn’t seem to be about L.L. Bean per se. And
in MasterCard International, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee,
Inc.,114 the court held that Ralph Nader’s political ad in the 2000
presidential campaign based on the MasterCard “Priceless” ad campaign
was a lawful parody.115 But while Nader’s ad was clearly social
commentary, and while Nader argued that his ad was in fact designed in
part to mock MasterCard, the ad was really satire, not parody. It was
designed to use a well-known ad campaign to make a social commentary
about something — campaign finance — unrelated to MasterCard.
Indeed, one might question (as both Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and
the Sixth Circuit opinion did) whether 2 Live Crew’s “Big Hairy
Woman” song was really a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” or
just a take-off from it. Justice Kennedy worried in Campbell “that not
just any commercial takeoff is rationalized post hoc as a parody.”116 But
arguably a preference for parody over satire gives just such an incentive.
In many cases, therefore, the parties fight about whether a work is in
fact a parody at all as a prelude to (or perhaps a proxy for) debating
whether it is legal. For courts that focus on the parody/satire distinction,
that requires them to make some tough choices in deciding what qualifies
as a parody: is a subsidiary purpose to make fun of the plaintiff enough,
or must it be the primary focus of the defendant’s use? How confident
must we be that it is a parody? Does the defendant’s intent to make a
parody (or not) matter? Does it matter how the audience perceives it?
Consider, for instance, Chik-Fil-A’s complaint over Eat More Kale Tshirts.117 Bo Muller-Moore, the maker of the shirts, said he didn’t intend
to make fun of Chik-Fil-A or its “Eat More Chikin” slogan.118 But some
113

Id. at 34.
No. 00 Civ.6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004). Full
disclosure: one of us (Lemley) represented Nader in this case.
115
Id. at *2-9.
116
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 600 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
117
The fight over Eat More Kale is now the subject of an upcoming documentary, A
DEFIANT DUDE.
118
Bo Muller-Moore, EAT MORE KALE, http://eatmorekale.com/ (last visited Sept. 7,
2013) (“I’m asked all the time, ‘Hey Bo, what do you mean by “Eat More Kale” and
where did the phrase come from?’ . . . Most obviously, it’s about eating healthier. Kale
can be delicious and a SUPER FOOD! You *should* eat more of it. . . . Eat More Kale is
114
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people might see it that way, or at least see it as a takeoff that provides a
humorous contrast with the fast-food mark. If we focus on the
defendant’s intent, the result would be that Bo’s shirts would not be
parodies, but identical shirts made by someone who sought to mock the
fast food industry would be. If instead we focus on how consumers
perceive the shirts, we face an expensive fact determination ancillary to
the primary likelihood of confusion determination. And it is not clear
what value that information has.
Perhaps we could use the court as a gatekeeper, bending over
backwards to perceive parody if at all possible and weeding cases out
pre-trial.119 That’s the approach copyright law takes, though copyright
has always been less concerned than trademark with the reactions of
individual consumers.120 A judicial judgment about whether something is
a parody has advantages over both the defendant’s belief and the
public’s, though it risks missing parodies that appeal to a younger or
culturally different audience than tends to inhabit the federal bench. A
number of people have worried that the Sixth Circuit in Campbell simply
didn’t “get” 2 Live Crew’s music;121 one might similarly worry about
about supporting small business, business that actually cares and hasn’t been swallowed
up by profit-hungry, corporate mentality.”).
119
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582 & n.16 (the parodic character need only be
reasonably perceivable, and need not be of high quality). One study finds that when
Campbell is cited in a trademark parody case, the defendant almost always wins. See
Simon, The Confusion Trap, supra note 61, at 29-40.
120
See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 26, at 1604 (acknowledging and largely
defending “norm followership” in trademark law); Dogan & Lemley, Grounding
Trademark, supra note 26, at 1693-98 (discussing ways in which trademark law defines
itself by reference to consumer attitudes, which in turn are often shaped by legal rules);
Jeanne Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement,
MICH.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2014)
(draft
at
33),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2272235 (trademark law is more
focused on actual consumer reaction than other IP laws). Arguably this is the approach
the court took in Walking Mountain in rejecting a survey purporting to show confusion.
Cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, Of Mutant Copyrights, Mangled Trademarks, and Barbie’s
Beneficence: The Influence of Copyright on Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 481 (arguing that
trademark has borrowed speech-protective rules from copyright’s parody cases).
121
See, e.g., Gary Myers, Trademark Parody: Lessons from the Copyright Decision in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 181, 187 (1996)
(“At this point, [Campbell] addressed the central error in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, the
presumptive weight it gave to 2 Live Crew’s commercial motivation for its parody.”); cf.
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip-Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright,
and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006) (situating Campbell in the context of
hip-hop norms about reuse).
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judges not “getting” the Enjoy Cocaine poster in Gemini Rising or a host
of other modern parodies.
Perhaps there is a way for trademark law to avoid drawing this line
altogether. It is not clear that trademark owners have any strong need to
prevent satire. In Campbell, the Court focused on the defendant’s need to
use the plaintiff’s work rather than any other work, suggesting that satire
required more justification for copying because it didn’t have to use the
plaintiff’s work.122 That argument has always rung a bit hollow even in
copyright; if no one wants their works to be used as a basis for satire, the
fact that there are many other potential plaintiffs whose works I can’t use
either is cold comfort indeed.123 But the argument seems to have even
less force in trademark law. Unlike copyright, which is designed to
prevent copying and to give copyright owners control over the use of the
work itself, trademark law cares only about the brand-product connection
in the minds of consumers and how that might affect producer
incentives.124 There is little reason to think that either parody or satire
interferes with that connection; to the contrary, both will often reinforce
the connection by calling to mind the famous brand or ad campaign they
mimic.125 And there is even less reason to think that satire will cause
more interference with the connection than parody does.126
122

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81.
See Keller & Tushnet, supra note 65, at 979-80 (making this point).
124
For discussion, see, for example, Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra
note 56.
125
Barton Beebe has made this point about tarnishment. See Barton Beebe, A Defense
of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1143, 1150-51 (2006). For general discussion, see Desai, From Trademarks to
Brands, supra note 58, at 1007-08; Heymann, The Law of Reputation, supra note 96, at
1341.
We dealt above with a related argument — that satire will “overexpose” a mark and
therefore weaken its value. For criticism of that argument, see generally Mark A. Lemley,
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 147
(2004) [hereinafter Ex Ante]. Lemley notes:
123

Where a work is truly iconic, even repeated debasement is unlikely to affect
public perceptions. Justin Hughes observes that the Statue of Liberty, the Mona
Lisa, Mount Rushmore, and the Eiffel Tower retain their iconic status despite
repeated uses and abuses in many different contexts. So too do the works of
Shakespeare and the characters Frankenstein (and his monster), Dracula,
Scrooge, Uncle Sam, and King Arthur.
Id. at 146 n.63 (citing Justin Hughes, “Recording” Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 961 (1999)).
126
For criticism of the distinction, see Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and
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A number of scholars, including one of the authors, have argued
recently that trademark law needs a trademark injury requirement under
which plaintiffs could block only uses that actually changed consumer
perceptions or behavior.127 Under a trademark injury filter, courts might
not have to decide whether a particular referential use was parody or
satire, because the law should protect both of them in the ordinary case in
which neither parody nor satire is likely to have any material impact on
consumer purchasing decisions. While parodies and satires may well
influence consumers’ view of a brand, neither is likely to do so in a way
trademark law should care about — by confusing consumers at the point
of purchase or interfering with the uniqueness of the mark as signifier.
Importing the Rogers v. Grimaldi test from the right of publicity may
effect just such an end-run, depending on how broadly the courts define
“artistic relevance.” We can imagine a court concluding that Outkast’s
song “Rosa Parks” was artistically relevant to Rosa Parks because it
contained the line “everyone move to the back of the bus,” even though
the song was not in fact about Rosa Parks at all.128
Under existing law, however, trademark holders can prevail if there’s
confusion about their sponsorship of a product, even if the confusion
causes them no harm. As a result, it’s at least theoretically possible to
have consumer confusion in the case of satire; consumers could, we
suppose, be confused over whether the trademark holder has made the
satirical point. We think it’s doubtful, but the possibility of such
confusion may make it harder to resolve cases early, without resort to
any likelihood of confusion analysis.
Parodies, however, by their very nature make confusion improbable,
and dilution highly unlikely. Trademark holders are unlikely to develop
brands that lampoon themselves, and consumers are unlikely to believe
that they’ve done so.129 And as the Louis Vuitton court recognized,
the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 478
(2006); Ochoa, supra note 110, at 548-64, 609-10.
127
See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 36, at 448-53; Lemley
& McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 56, at 188-89; McKenna, Consumer
Decision-Making Theory, supra note 41, at 124-33; Tushnet, From A to B, supra note 36,
at 1368-73; cf. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 176-81 (2012) (proposing
an analogous copyright injury requirement).
128
As it happens, the court found the issue to present a question of fact that could not
be resolved on summary judgment. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459-60 (6th
Cir. 2003).
129
Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“[T]he
unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons
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parodies will rarely dilute, because their commentary calls attention to
the famous trademark and reinforces its fame.130 Classifying a use as a
parody should therefore enable earlier resolution of cases even under
current legal standards. In an ideal world, of course, courts would do a
better job of handling expressive uses of trademarks more generally.131
But given the realities of existing law, we think that parodies, at the very
least, present an attractive case for special treatment.
Doing so requires us to confront the definitional problem directly.132
It’s not an easy task; because parody and satire have more commonalities
than differences, courts reach decisions that sometimes leave us
scratching our heads.133 But at least in cases of clear parody, we see some
value in carving out a separate defense. So we proceed here with the task
even while understanding that at some level it is futile, because defining
parody may enable us to take at least some easy cases out of court early.
We think a parody need not be intended solely as a parody; many
brands seek to convey multiple messages at once. Nor should parody
depend on the defendant’s intent that something be a parody; it is worth
noting that 2 Live Crew originally defended its song as a cover of the
Orbison original, not as a parody. To focus on the defendant’s intent
of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing
market.”). However, there is some evidence of both self-parody as an advertising strategy
(Isuzu’s “He’s Lying” commercials) and even a willingness to license some parody, as
Weird Al Yankovic does.
130
See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 267
(4th Cir. 2007).
131
See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 36, at 444-48;
McGeveran, supra note 14, at 109-23; William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna,
Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
132
For a critical analysis of how courts determine whether parody “can reasonably be
perceived” in copyright cases, see generally David A. Simon, Reasonable Perception and
Parody in Copyright Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 779.
133
The Second Circuit, for example, described “Charbucks” as “at most, a subtle
satire of the Starbucks Marks.” Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588
F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2009). We’re not sure what the difference is between a subtle satire
of a product and a parody of that product; according to the Supreme Court, at least, the
use of a mark to poke even subtle fun at that mark would be parody rather than satire.
The court seems to have thought that “Charbucks” was at most a joke about the dark roast
of the Starbucks coffee (and therefore directed at dark roast generally), ignoring its rather
more obvious implication that people are wasting their money buying expensive cups of
Starbucks coffee. The fact that a court of appeals can garble the distinction in a case this
easy gives us pause in endorsing it.
The Second Circuit ultimately affirmed a finding that Charbucks was not dilutive,
using the ordinary dilution test rather than relying on parody. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s
Borough Coffee, Inc., No. 12-354-cv, 2013 WL 6037227 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2013).
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would not only be unworkable but would cause similar uses to be treated
differently depending on the defendant’s state of mind and how careful
they were in documenting their intent.
That leaves the public and the courts as possible arbiters of what is a
parody. Both have their problems. Relying on the public simply falls
back on the likelihood of confusion standard, here to determine not the
fact of confusion but whether people thought the trademark owner or a
third party was the target of the defendant’s use. It would mean that it is
essentially impossible to resolve parody cases pre-trial. The best (or
least-bad) alternative may be to follow copyright and have judges make
their own assessment of whether something is a parody, putting a thumb
on the scale of finding parody in doubtful cases. That’s not a perfect
solution, because judges may not “get” the joke in many popular culture
cases. But it may be the best we can do as long as courts are unwilling to
put satire on equal footing with parody.
B. Implementing a Parody Defense
The next question is how to implement such a defense. Should parody
serve as a stand-alone defense that automatically defeats any likelihood
of confusion? Or should courts inquire into confusion, allowing the
parody only when confusion is impossible or highly unlikely? What kind
of confusion, for that matter, should count?
It might seem logical to look to Rogers v. Grimaldi, given its value in
non-brand parody cases. As discussed above, Rogers allows use of
trademarks in expressive products as long as the mark has artistic
relevance to the work and does not expressly mislead.134 But Rogers
offers little guidance outside the expressive work context. A rule that
considers a trademark’s relationship to a movie, book, or video game
does not apply readily to names of commodities such as coffee or dog
toys. At the same time, parodies match up with the Second Circuit’s core
insight — that the risk of confusion with some sorts of uses might be so
small, and countervailing speech interests so substantial, that courts
should dispense with analysis of likelihood of confusion.135 The trick is
finding the doctrinal vehicle for analyzing parodies.
We think that trademark’s nominative fair use doctrine — with some
tweaking — could serve as an adequate tool for resolving most brand
parody cases without resort to likelihood of confusion. In cases in which
134
135

See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).

506

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:473

the nominative fair use defense does not apply, courts should turn to a
full analysis of likelihood of confusion and dilution. When this happens,
however, they must take care to avoid some of the pitfalls that have led
courts to find obvious parodies infringing. We offer some preliminary
thoughts about how that analysis ought to proceed.
1.

Nominative Fair Use.

Nominative fair use is a common law doctrine that allows certain uses
of trademarks to refer to the mark holder itself, or its products. The two
primary tests used in nominative fair use cases come from the Ninth and
Third circuits. The Ninth Circuit, which first formally devised the test,
allows a nominative use if the defendant meets three conditions:
First, the product or service . . . [is] not readily identifiable
without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark
or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the
product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that
would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.136
The Third Circuit applies a similar test, but its third prong asks whether
“defendant’s conduct or language reflect[s] the true and accurate
relationship between plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.”137
Admittedly, both of these tests turn in part on consumer expectations;
courts cannot assess whether a defendant’s use of a mark is “accurate” —
or whether it improperly suggests endorsement — without some
136

New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992); see also Toyota Motor Sales, U.S., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175-83 (9th
Cir. 2010); cf. Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44 (1st Cir.
2013) (recognizing and applying nominative fair use but without adopting any particular
definition).
137
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir.
2005); see also id. at 223 & n.4 (“Fairness is a distinct concept from confusion, and it
should be measured through a distinct inquiry.”). The court also fiddled a bit with the
other New Kids factors. In full, the Third Circuit’s nominative fair use standard requires
the defendant to show:
(1) that the use of plaintiff’s mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiff’s
product or service and the defendant’s product or service; (2) that the defendant
uses only so much of the plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff’s
product; and (3) that the defendant’s conduct or language reflect the true and
accurate relationship between [the parties].
Id. at 222.
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reference to how consumers will perceive the use.138 As a result, critics
have complained that nominative fair use simply re-entangles courts in
the same likelihood of confusion inquiries that define infringement in the
first place.139 Yet the role of consumer expectations is quite different in
the two contexts. In the general likelihood of confusion context,
consumer perception is the very heart of the inquiry: the factfinder must
assess whether, given the nature of the parties, their products, and the
marks at issue, consumers might mistakenly perceive a source- or
sponsorship-oriented relationship between the parties. The defendant
does not ordinarily have any particular reason for using the plaintiff’s
trademark, so the factfinder has no purpose against which to measure the
nature of the use. In nominative fair use, in contrast, the defendant has a
reason to use the mark; the factfinder’s task is to assess how the use
measures up against that legitimate purpose. This at least admits the
possibility of a textual inquiry that relies on the court’s objective
assessment of whether the defendant’s use promotes valid referential
goals or instead appears intended to mislead.140 As a result, judges may
be able to resolve nominative fair use issues without prolonged factual
inquiries into consumer perceptions.141
138
See, e.g., Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1176 (noting that third prong of nominative fair use
— whether defendant has improperly suggested sponsorship or endorsement — should be
assessed from the perspective of the “reasonably prudent consumer”); Century 21, 425
F.3d at 231 (considering whether defendant’s behavior “rendered the use inaccurate or
was somehow misleading as to any endorsement or relationship”).
139
See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 14, at 88-97 (arguing that the substitution of fair
use requirements for likelihood of confusion analysis is a significant problem that
prejudices fair uses and prolongs litigation); see also, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, Trademark
Use, supra note 26 (making the point more generally).
140
See, e.g., Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1181-82 (considering context of website and domain
name in evaluating second and third factors of nominative fair use standard).
141
See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 224 (“Our test for nominative fair use considers
distinct factors that are readily susceptible to judicial inquiry.”). Importantly, the Third
Circuit approach, unlike the Ninth Circuit, treats nominative use as a defense even in the
face of confusion, while the Ninth Circuit could be read as saying that if consumers are
confused as to sponsorship or affiliation the defendant is disentitled to a defense. So
understood, the Ninth Circuit test wouldn’t be a defense at all, but collapses into the
confusion inquiry. Indeed, some circuits, like the Sixth Circuit, view nominative fair use
as redundant because, they believe, it protects uses that are inherently unlikely to cause
confusion. See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir.
2003) (“This circuit has never followed the nominative fair use analysis, always having
applied [the circuit’s likelihood of confusion] test.”), abrogated by KP Permanent MakeUp, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004). For criticism of the Ninth
Circuit on this ground, see Greg Lastowka, Nominative Fair Use Makes No Sense (Oct.
9,
2013)
(working
paper),
available
at
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In essence, the nominative fair use inquiry asks whether the defendant
had a legitimate reason to use the mark to evoke the trademark holder; if
so, the doctrine considers how the actual use matches up against that
purpose. The doctrine recognizes that certain forms of communication
require use of trademarks to achieve their expressive goals. You can’t
really compare a new product to an entrenched market leader without
using the leader’s trademark. It’s hard to tout the sale of after-market
parts without naming the cars that they were designed to repair. A news
channel can’t convey which sporting event it is covering without using
the event’s name.142
Indeed, it is often virtually impossible to refer to a particular
product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference
or any other such purpose without using the mark. For example,
reference to a large automobile manufacturer based in Michigan
would not differentiate among the Big Three; reference to a large
Japanese manufacturer of home electronics would narrow the
field to a dozen or more companies. Much useful social and
commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers
were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they
made reference to a person, company or product by using its
trademark.143
In all of these contexts, the nature of the defendant’s communicative
goals requires use of the trademark; the question for the court is really
whether the defendant’s use of the mark is coextensive with those goals,
or whether it has exceeded its justification.
If, as we believe, trademark parodies are a unique and non-replicable
form of speech about trademark holders, then they resemble the sorts of
uses that nominative fair use seeks to protect. They involve speech about
the trademark holder, and they cannot serve their inherent function —
indeed, they can’t be a parody — without borrowing from the original.144
Nominative fair use thus offers a ready framework for analyzing
trademark parodies. But how do we analyze the critical third factor (i.e.,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338296.
142
See WCVB-TV v. Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991).
143
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306-07 (9th Cir.
1992).
144
See Mattel v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 (9th Cir. 2003)
(applying nominative fair use when defendant “used Mattel’s Barbie figure and head in
his works to conjure up associations of Mattel, while at the same time to identify his own
work, which is a criticism and parody of Barbie”).
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whether the defendant’s actions match up to its legitimate speech-related
objectives)?
In many ways, the considerations underlying nominative fair use
mirror those at issue in copyright law’s treatment of parody. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, to do its job, a parody must borrow
substantially from the target of its scorn.145 It must borrow at least
enough to evoke the work in the mind of the observer. Yet that’s not all
— the borrower can take more than necessary to evoke the work, as long
as it’s done to further the parody and doesn’t come so close to the
original that it morphs into a substitute (rather than a parody) of the
original work.146
This logic folds nicely into trademark analysis of nominative fair use.
First, in order to present an effective parody of a trademark, it is
necessary to borrow substantially from that mark. As long as a parodic
character can “reasonably be perceived,” the necessity kicks in.147
Second, the court must examine the defendant’s use of the mark to
determine whether it goes too far beyond the parodic purpose. If the
parody pervades the defendant’s use, then substantial taking is justified;
if, however, the parody is hard to perceive and the taking is substantial,
then this requirement might not be satisfied. Finally, the court should
consider the overall context of the use to determine whether the
defendant did anything beyond mere use of the mark that suggests
source-affiliation or sponsorship by the trademark holder. Precision on
this last point is critical: as noted above, a reading of the Ninth Circuit
test that permits evidence of confusion to defeat the defense would
render nominative fair use a nullity. The third factor must refer to acts
beyond the parody itself that cause confusion.
2. Trademark Standards When Nominative Fair Use Doesn’t Apply.
The above analysis should resolve cases involving trademark parodies.
In some cases, however, the court might believe that the parodist went
145

See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587-89 (1994). In fact, the
line between parody and satire isn’t as clear here either. Haute Diggity Dog could have
chosen to parody a brand other than Louis Vuitton, so it didn’t need the Vuitton mark in a
strict sense.
146
See id. at 588 (“Once enough has been taken to assure identification, how much
more is reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which the song’s overriding purpose
and character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may
serve as a market substitute for the original.”).
147
See id. at 582.
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well beyond what was necessary to achieve its expressive goals, creating
at least the possibility of confusion or dilution by doing something other
than parodying the mark. Or it might conclude that the defense doesn’t
apply because the defendant’s brand is purely satire or other humor
rather than parody. When this happens, the court must move beyond
nominative fair use and tackle, head on, the questions of likelihood of
confusion and dilution.148 We have some thoughts about the appropriate
analysis in these expressive non-parody cases.
First, to the extent that the court perceives a parodic purpose but
believes that the defendant’s use of the mark exceeds that purpose and
risks confusing the public, the court should resist the call for a complete
injunction in favor of one that addresses the excesses while preserving
the parody. Here, too, nominative fair use offers useful precedent. As the
Ninth Circuit held in Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari,149 courts
considering nominative fair use cases should tailor injunctive relief to the
particular excesses that create the risk of confusion. “At the very least,”
the court held, injunctions must be crafted to allow the defendant to
achieve its nominative objectives. “Trademarks are part of our common
language, and we all have some right to use them to communicate in
truthful, non-misleading ways.”150
Second, courts should absolutely reject the notion that confusion as to
permission is ever actionable as a matter of trademark law. For all we
know, some substantial portion of the public may assume that trademark
holders have a legal right to prevent any unauthorized use of their mark.
It would be odd lawmaking indeed if courts defined legal rules by what
the public thinks the law is, regardless of how misguided those
perceptions may be. Of course, some amount of circularity is endemic in
trademark law; the fact that infringement turns on the risk of consumer
confusion makes it inevitable that the law will sometimes over-protect

148

Something similar may be required where the brand owner has itself entered the
market for self-parody. While that prospect seems unlikely in the abstract, see Richard A.
Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 74 (1992), there is evidence
that brands not only license the right to make fun of them from time to time, but even run
advertisements or sell products that seem parodic, such as Louis Vuitton’s graffiti
collection. The possibility of self-parody may heighten the chance of confusion, though
we are skeptical that any brand owner should own the right to parody itself. See generally
Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 56 (arguing that brand owners have
no sound legal claim to prevent use of their mark in unrelated markets).
149
610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).
150
Id. at 1185.
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marks.151 But at least in the ordinary case, the claim of confusion has
some plausible relevance to trademark law’s goal of protecting consumer
expectations about who makes or stands behind products. The fact that a
consumer might mistakenly believe that a trademark holder gave
permission to make fun of itself has nothing to do with that kind of
confusion. It is a quintessential example of “irrelevant confusion.”152
Third, in cases in which a brand use is also making an expressive
statement, the expressive nature of the defendant’s use should influence
the entire inquiry into likelihood of confusion and dilution, just as it does
for fair use in copyright law. Strength and similarity of marks, for
example, should not serve its ordinary role of cutting in favor of
confusion. If anything, for more famous marks, the satire will arguably
be more recognizable; and, as discussed above, significant borrowing of
the trademark may be important to the message being conveyed even if
the defendant is not directly parodying the brand.153 Analysis of
similarity should operate on a sliding scale, in which the stronger the
expressive nature, the closer the marks may come to one another without
this factor weighing in favor of confusion.154
The dilution inquiry should likewise recognize that the very nature of
expressive works will often require deliberate use of a recognizable
mark. As a result, factors such as the mark’s renown and the intent to
create an association between the marks cannot serve their usual function
of cutting in favor of dilution. Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit recognized in
Louis Vuitton, several of the dilution factors arguably cut in opposite
directions. The more famous the mark, for example, the less likely that a
parody will impair its distinctiveness.155 Courts in dilution cases should
151
See Gibson, supra note 65, at 912; cf. Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right,
supra note 56 (arguing that trademark law must sometimes serve as a norm entrepreneur
rather than a norm follower).
152
See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 36, at 427.
153
Cf. Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1836 (2007) (noting the irony of strong, famous marks
needing protection from confusion); Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked
Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1354 (1980) (same).
154
See also Simon, The Confusion Trap, supra note 61 (manuscript at 4) (arguing that
a rebuttable presumption in favor of a parody “can simultaneously reduce the threat of
frivolous lawsuits by trademark owners and ensure legitimate claims against an infringer
[proceed] without unnecessary hurdles”).
155
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 267 (4th
Cir. 2007) (“[B]ecause the famous mark is particularly strong and distinctive, it becomes
more likely that a parody will not impair the distinctiveness of the mark.”); see also
Lemley, Ex Ante, supra note 125, at 145-48 (offering examples of famous icons that
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consider the factors in light of the ultimate question: whether the
defendant’s use affects the famous mark’s ability to serve as a “unique
identifier of its source.”156
Fourth, given the value of even non-parodic but expressive uses, such
as satire, small amounts of confusion should not justify an injunction.
While trademark law generally finds infringement if even a small
minority of consumers are confused,157 it does so because there is no
countervailing interest on the other side. By contrast, where there are
consumer interests on both sides of the ledger, trademark law has tended
to require higher confusion thresholds. To prove a mark generic, for
instance, the law requires that a substantial majority of the public thinks
it is, because the consumers who don’t think so will be injured.158 A
parody or satire gives consumers who get the joke an interest in the
defendant’s brand that an injunction would stymie. Before we impose
that injunction, we should be significantly more confident that harm to
the confused consumers outweighs the harm to those who have an
interest in the defendant’s speech. The fact that there are interests on
both sides may also affect the choice of remedy. Trademark law
generally gives little shrift to disclaimers,159 but parody and satire may be
retain their status despite constant dilution).
156
Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 267.
157
See Henri’s Food Prods., Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358-59 (7th Cir.
1983) (holding that 7.6% confusion was insufficient to establish likelihood of confusion,
but collecting authorities finding likelihood of confusion based on surveys showing as
low as 8.5% confusion among consumers); Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Hous.,
Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that 15% was sufficient); Jockey Int’l,
Inc. v. Burkard, No. 74 123 S, 1975 WL 21128, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21,
1975) (discussing survey evidence that “11.4 percent of the universe . . . would associate
defendants’ JOCK SOCK underwear package with plaintiff”); Grotrian, Helfferich,
Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(“[O]f 520 people canvassed . . . 7.7% . . . preceived [sic] a business connection between
the two companies and 8.5% confused the names.”), modified on other grounds, 523 F.2d
1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
158
See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101-02 (2d
Cir. 1989); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir.
1963). Descriptive fair use does the same, providing a partial defense that can be
overcome in some circumstances, but only with a higher showing of confusion. See KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-23 (2004).
159
See JR Tobacco of Am., Inc. v. Davidoff of Geneva (CT), Inc., 957 F. Supp. 426,
437 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[G]enerally, a disclaimer is ineffective to cure a literally false
statement.”). As the Callman treatise puts it, “[e]xperience has taught that a business
acquires a material advantage over its competitors if it arrests the attention of the
prospective purchaser. Deception followed by enlightment [sic] and explanation does not
negate this initial advantage.” LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMAN ON
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circumstances where the appropriate response to all but the highest levels
of confusion is not an injunction or a change to the defendant’s brand,
but merely requiring the defendant to make clear that they are not
associated with the plaintiff.
Doing so may also avoid conflicts with the First Amendment. The
Ninth Circuit has emphasized the significant risks trademark law poses to
speech in cases like Barbie Girl.160 And it has done so even in cases that
have no arguable claim to parody, such as a football player objecting to
his depiction in a football video game.161 Laura Heymann has explained
how the low confusion threshold makes the problem worse.162 And as
one of the authors has argued, that risk is heightened when the remedy is
an injunction against the protected speech.163 In the absence of a pure
defense for brand parodies or satires, the combination of a higher
confusion threshold and limited remedies may end up providing at least
some speech protection.
CONCLUSION
Brand parodies serve useful social purposes and are unlikely to
interfere with any legitimate interests of trademark owners. But the fact
that they are both parodies and brands means that their legal status is
unclear. We think brand parodies deserve clear legal protection, and that
existing law can provide that protection if it is properly understood.

TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND MONOPOLIES § 5.31 (4th ed. 2013). For a
discussion of trademark disclaimers, see generally Laura A. Heymann, Reading the
Product: Warnings, Disclaimers, and Literary Theory, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 393
(2010).
160
See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902-07 (9th Cir. 2002); see
also Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003).
161
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239-41 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying
Rogers test to non-parodic use of a brand, and noting that the rule was the same whether
the defendant’s use was in the title or body of the work).
162
See Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First
Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 702-03 (2009).
163
See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 216-24 (1998).

